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BAPCPA AND COMMERCIAL CREDIT: WHO (SIC)
DO YOU TRUST?'
DAVID G. EPSTEIN2
Trying to understand and apply the many different provisions of
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA) has caused people to yearn for the "good old days." At the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges' (NCBJ) Annual Meeting in
San Antonio in October 2005, there was a lot of talk about the "good
old days"3 and some singing "'bout the good old days" at the NCBJ
"Final Night Dinner" by a larger than life (at least as large as Sally
Struthers), Wynonna Judd.4
And this has caused me to remember a daytime television show
from my good old days: "Who Do You Trust?"
5 BAPCPA is like this
1. This article was prepared in November 2005 originally and exclusively 
for
presentation to the 2006 North Carolina Banking Institute and publication in 
the North
Carolina Banking Institute Journal. Feel free to use the stuff in this article however 
you
wish, with the understanding that everything written in the article and 
said in my
presentation is, at best, my best guess as to what the law is, or should be.
2. I teach at the Dedman School of Law of Southern Methodist University, in Dallas,
Texas and continue to have a relationship with the law firm of King & Spalding. 
I am
grateful for the opportunities to work with the students at SMU and the lawyers at 
King &
Spalding. I am grateful for the many other professional opportunities I have 
had; I am
especially grateful to the University of North Carolina School of Law, which gave 
me my
first opportunity to teach.
3. Particularly from the "alter knockers," such as Leonard Gilbert and Bill Sullivan.
4. See Wynonna: Official Worldwide Website, http://www.wynonna.com/ (Lyrics are
available under "Music" then "Greatest Hits").
5. "Who Do You Trust?" was a daytime television series from 1957-62, starring
Johnny Carson. See generally RONALD L. SMITH, JOHNNY CARSON 
- AN UNAUTHORIZED
BIOGRAPHY (1987). I was a teenager then: watching television in the afternoon,
"discovering" girls, and... Definitely good old days. I understand (as do the law review
editors) that this footnoted statement is a sentence fragment. One of the best teachers from
my "good old days," my 10th grade English teacher Miss Lindemann, told me 
that I could
use sentence fragments after I had a book published.
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comedy/quiz show in (1) the poor choice of words in the title,6 and (2)
the focus on whom is to be trusted 7 to answer questions.
The title "Who Do You Trust" is obviously grammatically
incorrect. It is equally obvious that whatever BAPCPA is, it is not, as
the title states, a "consumer protection act."
Each afternoon on Who Do You Trust?, two contestants who
did not necessarily know each other would decide which of the two
would be trusted to answer a particular question.8  In BAPCPA,
Congress has repeatedly decided that it does not trust anyone to answer
bankruptcy questions.
I. CONGRESS'S LACK OF TRUST OF DEBTORS
Congress's lack of trust in consumer debtors has already been
documented and debated by others.9  New provisions requiring
consumer education, documentation, and income and expense
calculations are the most obvious examples.'0 BAPCPA is also rich in
obvious examples of Congress's lack of trust of business debtors, large
and small.
6. "Who Do You Trust?" is, of course, grammatically incorrect. See BRYAN A.GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON STYLE § 10.3 (2002). Perhaps, the show's producer,Don Fedderson, had an English teacher who told him that he did not need to follow accepted
rules of grammar if he ever had a network game show.
7. This article uses the word "trust" in the same way that Professor Frank Cross usesthe word in his new article that focuses on trust in economic transactions between privateparties. Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1461 (2005) ("(T)he voluntary
ceding of control over something valuable [or important] to another person or entity, basedupon one's faith in the ability and willingness of that person or entity to care for the
valuable thing.").
8. The more interesting part of the show was Johnny Carson's pre-quiz conversations
with the contestants. For example, "(a) body builder who was a contestant once cautionedCarson to respect his own body "the only house he'd ever have.' 'My house is prettymessy,' Carson retorted, 'but I have a woman come in once a week to clean it out."' PAULCORKERY, CARSON: THE UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 77 (1987).
9. See generally Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense:Representing Consumers Under the "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, " 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191 (2005).
10. See generally Hon. Keith M. Lundin, Ten Principles of BAPCPA: Not What WasAdvertised, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 67, 68-9 (2005).
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A. Making the right decisions regarding management
BAPCPA shows that Congress does not trust business debtors to
make the "right" decisions regarding management. Or that Congress
does not understand how decisions regarding management of a debtor in
the "zone of insolvency" are made."
1. Trustee
New § 1104(e) requires the United States Trustee to move for
the appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 case when there are
grounds to believe that there may be fraud or criminal conduct among
the governing body of the debtor or among the executives whom chose
the governing body in financial reporting.
12
This provision does not change the standards the bankruptcy
court is to apply in determining whether to appoint a trustee. The
general "cause" standard in § 1104(a) remains unchanged.
Section 1104(e) does not even change the standards for a private
party's filing a motion for the appointment of a trustee. Before and
after BAPCPA, any party in interest may move for the appointment of a
trustee in a Chapter 11 case because of "actual fraud."
What has been changed is that now the United States Trustee
must so move. Note the word "shall" in § 1104(e). 3
Note also the phrase "reasonable grounds to suspect." Section
1104(e) is the only Bankruptcy Code provision to use that phrase.
Other Bankruptcy Code sections use the phrase "reasonable cause to
believe."' 4  Obviously, "reasonable grounds to suspect" is a lower
standard.
11. Officers and directors of corporations that are in the "zone of insolvency" 
now
generally understand that they have expanded fiduciary duties that include the 
creditors.
Helen Shaw, Fiduciary Duty in the Zone of Insolvency, CFO MAG., Aug. 25, 2005, at 1.
And creditors of the corporation are generally included in major decisions regarding
management. Id.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(e) (2005). ("The United States trustee shall move for the
appointment of a trustee under subsection (a) if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that
current members of the governing body of the debtor, the debtor's chief executive 
or chief
financial officer, or members of the governing body who selected the debtor's 
chief
executive or chief financial officer, participated in actual fraud, dishonesty, or 
criminal
conduct in the management of the debtor or the debtor's public financial reporting.").
13. Id.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(12) (2005); § 1141(d)(5)(C) (2005).
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 10
While § I104(e) should not change a court's ruling on a motion
to appoint a trustee, one could easily speculate that new § 1104(e) will
result in the United States Trustee filing more motions for the
appointment of a trustee, and will result in additional time-consuming,
costly litigation. Other "ones" (but not me) have also speculated that §1104(e) could result in "increased pressure to act prepetition to remove
CEOs and CFOs."' 5
2. KERPs (Key Employee Retention Plans)
Kmart is the "poster child" for reform of key employee retentionplans.' 6 Kmart filed for bankruptcy on January 22, 2002, and its CEO,
Chuck Conaway, left the company less than two months later and wasgranted $4 million in severance. 7 After BAPCPA, no more Chuck
Conaways as § 503(c) addresses company programs for post-petition
payments to key executives.18 It provides:
[T]here shall neither be allowed, nor paid-(1) a transfer made to, or an obligation incurred for the
benefit of, an insider of the debtor for the purpose of
inducing such person to remain with the debtor's
business, absent a finding by the court based on
evidence in the record that-
(A) the transfer or obligation is essential to retention of
the person because the individual has a bona fide job
offer from another business at the same or greater rate of
compensation;
(B) the services provided by the person are essential to
the survival of the business; and
15. Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11:The Significant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and ConsumerProtection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J 603, 620 (2005).
16. See generally Allison K. Verderber Herriott, Toward an Understanding of theDialetical Tensions Inherent in CEO and Key Employee Retention Plans DuringBankruptcy, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 579 (2004).
17. Nelson D. Schwartz, Greed-mart; Attention, Kmart Investors. The Company MayBe Bankrupt, but Its Top Brass Have Been Raking It In, FORTUNE, Oct. 14, 2002, at 139.18. A recent New York Times article on the Delphi Corporation bankruptcy
"addressed" Delphi's KERP as "[tiruly a Marie Antoinette moment." Gretchen Morgenson,Oohs andAhs at Delphi's Circus, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 2005 (Late Edition), § 3, at 1.
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(C) either-
(i)the amount of the transfer made to, or obligation
incurred for the benefit of, the person is not greater than
an amount equal to 10 times the amount of the mean
transfer or obligation of a similar kind given to
nonmanagement employees for any purpose during the
calendar year in which the transfer is made or the
obligation is incurred; or
(ii) if no such similar transfers were made to, or
obligations were incurred for the benefit of, such
nonmanagement employees during such calendar year,
the amount of the transfer or obligation is not greater
than an amount equal to 25 percent of the amount of any
similar transfer or obligation made to or incurred for the
benefit of such insider for any purpose during the
calendar year before the year in which such transfer is
made or obligation is incurred;
(2) a severance payment to an insider of the debtor,
unless-
(A) the payment is part of a program that is generally
applicable to all full-time employees; and
(B) the amount of the payment is not greater than 10
times the amount of the mean severance pay given to
nonmanagement employees during the calendar year in
which the payment is made; or
(3) other transfers or obligations that are outside the
ordinary course of business and not justified by the facts
and circumstances of the case, including transfers made
to, or obligations incurred for the benefit of, officers,
managers, or consultants hired after the date of the filing
of the petition.' 9
Note that the provision distinguishes among retention payments,
covered in subsection (1); and severance payments, restricted in
subsection (2); and other payments such as incentive bonus plans,
regulated in subsection (3).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 503(c) (2005).
2006]
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Don't feel guilty if you skimmed over or even skipped over
most of the statutory provision. In dealing with retention payment
programs, you can probably stop with the phrase "bona fide job offer
from another business at the same or greater rate of compensation" in §
503(c)(1)(A).2 0 A failing company cannot have its key executives out
looking for another job. And, a failing company might not want to keep
a key executive who is offered another position at the "same or greater
rate of compensation" with a company that is not failing and who is not
smart enough to take that other job.
In dealing with severance pay proposals, the key phrase in §
503(c)(2) is "generally applicable to all full-time employees." No
business can afford to pay all of its employees the kind of severance pay
that its top management asks for. While a severance payment plan
limited to employees with qualifying time tenure may qualify, a
severance plan limited to employees with qualifying rank is likely to be
disqualified.
The new deal for key executives may well be "performance"
incentive bonus plans, with the lowest possible qualifying thresholds.
Such plans will be subject to the "justified by the facts and
circumstances of the case" standard of § 503(c)(3), the easiest of the
three § 503(c) standards to meet.
B. Making timely decisions
Congress not only does not trust business debtors to make the
right decisions about management, but also does not trust business
debtors to make timely decisions. BAPCPA imposes new deadlines.
1. Exclusivity
Amended § 1121(d) limits the time for decisions on Chapter 11
plans. More specifically, the limitation on exclusivity is now eighteen
months. At most, this will impact only the largest, most contentious
cases.
2 1
20. § 503(c)(1)(a).
21. David A. Skeel, Jr., Dje vu All Over Again in American Corporate Bankruptcy?,
79 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NAT. CONF. OF BANKR. JUDGES, 12-7, 12-16 (2005) ("The new
restrictions on exclusivity are puzzling in two respects. First, they seem to be responding to
[Vol. 10
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2. Commercial real estate lease decisions
22
Until BAPCPA, a debtor had sixty days after the order for relief
to decide whether to assume or reject a lease of commercial, i.e.,
"nonresidential," real estate. And, the prevailing practice was for
extensions to be granted until the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan.
BAPCPA extends this initial period from sixty days to 120
days. 23 More important, BAPCPA caps nonconsensual extension of the
120-day period to ninety more days, a 210-day cap. This cap will affect
more cases than the new cap on exclusivity.
Consider the impact of this deadline on a retailer like Kmart that
leases hundreds of stores.24 Is the first 210 days of a bankruptcy case
enough time to make these business decisions?
And consider the impact of this deadline on a debtor like United
Airlines, Inc. that is using essential facilities under very complicated
transactions that are structured as leases, but that may or may not be
a by-gone problem... Second, the best recent evidence suggests that in relatively small
cases at least, judges have made remarkably good decisions about when to turn off the
spigot."). But see Alan M. Christenfeld & Shephard W. Melzer, 2005 Bankruptcy
Amendments: A Secured Creditor's Perspective, N.Y.L.J. August 4, 2005, at 5.
The elimination of judicial discretion to grant extensions of exclusivity
is likely to put increased pressure on debtors by inducing them to
propose reorganization plans, and by transferring bargaining leverage to
creditors and other parties in interest, at an earlier stage in the
proceedings than previously. It conceivably might prove fatal to debtors
that could reorganize given more time, especially in complex cases or
where vulture investors are circling the debtor. Secured creditors that
are at odds with a debtor may exploit the shortening of exclusivity to
file a plan of reorganization themselves, or to encourage another party in
interest to do so, despite opposition from the debtor. Different outcomes
may occur, however, where debtors and their secured creditors are not
in conflict and are cooperating to formulate a reorganization plan. The
curtailment of debtor exclusivity could then pose unforeseen obstacles
for the secured creditors by leaving them with weakened debtors and
potentially involving them in confirmation and other battles with
competing parties that might have been less emboldened or potent under
current law.
Id.
22. See generally Jordan Kirby, Note, Unexpired Leases Under the New Bankruptcy
Act: A Win- Win for Landlords and Lenders? 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 377 (2006).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (d)(4)(A). More precisely, the initial time period is now the earlier
of 120 days after the order for relief or the date of an entry of an order confirming the plan.
Id
24. See generally Brent Snavely & Jennette Smith, Slow Auction Leads Kmart to Give
Up Sale of Most Leases, CRAIN'S DETRIOT Bus., June 24, 2002, at 3.
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"true leases."25 Is the first 210 days of a bankruptcy case enough time
to resolve these difficult legal issues?
BAPCPA somewhat limits the effect of this cap on the time for
deciding whether to assume or reject by also imposing a cap on the
burden to the estate from a "bad" assumption decision. New §
503(b)(7) does three things: first, it recognizes the possibility that an
assumed lease can be rejected later in the case, second, it provides that
the damages from such later rejection will be a second priority
administrative expense claim, but third, it caps any such priority to two
years of future lease obligations.26
Note that § 365(d)(4) only limits the time for deciding whether
to assume or reject commercial leases. There is no deadline for
assignment decisions. Some debtors may be able to limit somewhat the
effect of § 365(d)(4) by obtaining an assumption order confirming that
any decision as to whether to assign leases that have been timely
assumed can be made later.
25. Cf United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609, 617 (7th Cir.
2005) ("The transaction between United and the CSCDA is not a 'true lease' under
California law.... We do not doubt that many financing devices are 'true leases."').
26. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(7). New § 503(b)(7) also provides that the claim for any
remaining amount due for the balance of the lease will be a claim subject to the cap in
section 502(b)(6). Id.
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I. CONGRESS'S LACK OF TRUST OF BANKRUPTCY JUDGES
27
The BAPCPA provisions considered in § 1 which reflect
Congress's lack of trust of debtors also reflects Congress's lack of trust
of bankruptcy judges. 28 As Judge Keith Lundin, a bankruptcy judge for
more than twenty years, wrote:
27. Congress's lack of trust to make bankruptcy decisions is not limited to bankruptcy
court judges. At the very least, this lack of trust extends to the judges who are involved in
the formulation and approval of the Bankruptcy Rules. This lack of trust can be seen in the
Rules Enabling Act. Professor Alan Resnick, who has served as a Reporter and as a
member of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, explains:
Section 2072 of Title 28 governs rulemaking relating to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Appellate Procedure,
and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Although these rules may not
modify substantive rights, § 2072(b) provides that "[a]ll laws in conflict
with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have
taken effect." This provision, commonly called the "supersession
clause," gives the Supreme Court flexibility in devising and amending
procedural rules that will supersede any current statute that may be in
conflict with them-so long as substantive rights are not affected. The
advisory committees for these bodies of rules are not constrained by
existing procedural statutory provisions in recommending changes to
improve efficiency in case administration and judicial procedure .... The
promulgation and amendment of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure are governed by § 2075, rather than § 2072. In contrast to §
2072, § 2075 does not contain a supersession clause. Therefore, the
Bankruptcy Rules are the only federal rules that may not conflict with a
procedural statutory provision.
The Bankruptcy Code and the bankruptcy-related sections of Title 28 of the
United States Code contain many provisions that are procedural in nature. Alan
N. Resnick, The Bankruptcy Rulemaking Process, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 245, 262
(1996).
28. An important question that can be asked but not answered in November 2005, one
month after the effective date of most BAPCPA provisions, is whether the perception of
bankruptcy judges that BAPCPA reflects Congress's lack of trust of bankruptcy judges will
affect bankruptcy court application and interpretation of BAPCPA provisions. In In re
McNabb, Judge Haines held that the language "as a result of electing under subsection
(b)(3)(A) to exempt property under state or local law" only applies to debtors in those
relatively few states that allow debtors to elect between § 522(b) and state exemptions.
Judge Haines looked to the "plain meaning" of the language only even though his plain
meaning meant that the provision limited debtors only in the states of Minnesota and Texas.
He did not consider legislative history or Congressional intent. 326 B.R. 785, 791 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 2005). However, in In re Kaplan, Judge Mark found that more than one plausible
reading of Congress's words exists, looking to legislative history for Congress's intent. He
also criticized the decision in McNabb: "[t]o arrive at this [the conclusion that the cap is
limited to the states of Minnesota and Texas] based on a strained and convoluted use of
statutory interpretation in the face of this unambiguous legislative intent is simply wrong.")
331 B.R. 483, 487-88 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005).
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BAPCPA arrived on a wave of anti-bankruptcy judge
rhetoric. As if blaming the court system for too many
people with debt trouble, BAPCPA is packed with
provisions intended to "reduce the discretion" of
bankruptcy judges....
You can bet the lobbyists who delivered BAPCPA will
be the first to claim it is the bankruptcy (non)judges who
are impeding and distorting all their good work.29
If Judge Lundin had written this article after his semester
teaching at the University of New Mexico School of Law,3° he might
have made the same point using the mud/crystal language" now in
vogue in the academy. For example, Professor A. Mechele Dickerson,
an outstanding young33 bankruptcy professor at the University of Texas
Law School, has opined
Legislators, and some academic commentators, seem
highly distrustful of bankruptcy judges' ability to
properly exercise judicial discretion .... Congress and
other bankruptcy critics seem to prefer clear, inflexible
"crystalline" rules that severely limit a court's ability to
29. Lundin, supra note 10, at 69; see also Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy
Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIz. L. REv. 559, 561 (2001). This
distrust of judges is evident in the recent bankruptcy reform efforts and in recent bankruptcy
scholarship of the "Law and Economics" stripe. These legislators and scholars use the
supposed incompetence of bankruptcy judges as a principal basis for arguments in favor oflimiting the goals of bankruptcy law and curbing the discretion of bankruptcy judges.
Indeed, some recent bankruptcy scholarship carries this disenchantment with bankruptcyjudges even further, seeking to make bankruptcy law irrelevant by reducing it to a set of
contractual default rules. Lundin, supra note 10, at 69.
30. Professor Lundin will be teaching at the University of New Mexico Law School
during the first half of 2006. See http://lawschool.unm.edu/faculty/lundin/index.php (last
visited Dec. 20, 2005).
31. Most of the law review articles that use this terminology refer to Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 604-05 (1988) (developing
mud/crystal terminology to describe rules of property law).
32. The phrase "in the academy" is also in vogue in the academy. E.g., Ernest A.
Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REv. 148, 152 (2005);
David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1699, 1794 (2005).
33. I.e., younger than me.
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make fact-based decisions over flexible "muddy" rules
that give courts considerably more discretion.34
While the examples that Professor Dickerson and Judge Lundin
use to illustrate Congress's lack of trust of bankruptcy judges are the
obvious Chapter 7/Chapter 13 provisions affecting consumer debtors,
there are also important examples of BAPCPA adding "crystalline
rules" or replacing "standards" with "rules"35 that affect business cases
in Chapters 3, 5, and 11.
A. A New (And Very "Muddy" Rule) for Goods Delivered Within
Twenty Days Before Bankruptcy
New § 503(b)(9) creates a new administrative priority for goods
received by the debtor within twenty days prior to the petition date. It
is necessary to see what § 503(b)(9) says (and does not say) in order to
see how "muddy" this "crystalline" rule is:
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed
administrative expenses, . . , including-
(9) the value of any goods received by the debtor within
20 days before the date of commencement of a case
34. A. Mechele Dickerson, Approving Employee Retention and Severance Progams:
Judicial Discretion Run Amuck?, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. REv. 93, 104-05 (2003); see also
Janger, supra note 29, at 623.
Muddy rules that confer discretion on judges in contexts where abusive
or inefficient non-cooperative behavior raise the cost of opting out of
the bankruptcy case. This dynamic operates even where we have no
confidence that bankruptcy judges are capable of identifying abuse.
Even where judges have limited capacity, the costs of litigation
associated with the open-textured rule will operate as an incentive to
cooperate. Moreover, this is not just true in the cases where the parties
actually litigate. It will also be true any time a party considers unilateral
action. Thus, when legislators and law reformers speak of eliminating
statutory ambiguity or of limiting judicial discretion, they should
recognize that increased statutory specificity may reduce the extent to
which broad statutory policies are incorporated into the behavior and
thinking of the parties subject to statutory regulation.
Id.
35. See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381-83
(1985) (exploring of the differences between "standards" and "rules").
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under this title in which the goods have been sold to
the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor's
business.36
The most obvious questions are created by what is not said
about "value., 37 For example, is value measured as of the time of the
delivery, the time of the petition, or the time of the payment? Value to
whom: the seller or the debtor? Replacement value or resale value? 38
Note also what is not said in § 503(b)(9) about the "prior rights
of a holder of a security interest in such goods." The new § 546(c)
provision on reclamation, discussed more fully in § III (B)(4), contains
this limiting phrase.3 9 Section 503(b)(9) does not.
Accordingly, it seems that the seller has an administrative
priority in the value of the delivered goods even though another creditor
has a security interest that reaches the delivered goods. In essence, the
estate could be paying twice for goods delivered to the debtor within
twenty days of bankruptcy: (1) to the lender with a floating lien on all of
the debtor's inventory, and (2) to the seller who now has an
administrative priority.
And consider the relationship of new § 503(b)(9) with §
546(c) and other Bankruptcy Code concepts and provisions. A vendor
who delivers goods within twenty days of bankruptcy can satisfy the
requirements of both §§ 503(b)(9) and 546(c). There is nothing in
either §§ 503(b)(9) or 546(c) that indicates that a vendor who meets the
requirements of both § 503(b)(9) and 546(c) is limited to reclamation
or an administrative priority.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2005).
37. Other possible litigable issues under new section 503(b)(9) include what are
"goods" and what is in the "ordinary course."
38. Elsewhere, BAPCPA is more "crystalline" about value. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2).
[V]alue... shall be determined based on the replacement value of such
property as of the date of the filing of the petition without deduction for costs
of sale or marketing. With respect to property acquired for personal, family,
or household purposes, replacement value shall mean the price a retail
merchant would charge for property of that kind considering the age and
condition of the property at the time value is determined. Id.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2005). Section 546(c) contains other limiting language that
does not appear in § 503(b)(9). Section 546(c) expressly requires that the debtor "received
such goods while insolvent." Id.
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Finally, consider what is not said in § 503(b)(9) about the time
of payment. A basic concept of Chapter 11 is that payment of claims,
including administrative priorities, are not paid until confirmation of the
plan. There is nothing in § 503(b)(9) that indicates an earlier payment
is necessary or permissible.4 °
If § 503(b)(9) payments are treated like other payments for
administrative obligations and deferred, it would seem that "critical
vendors" will still be persuading debtors to persuade judges to enter a
first day order authorizing their payment.4' Will this new statutory
priority make it more difficult to persuade bankruptcy judges to enter
orders authorizing immediate payment to "critical vendors?"
If so, consider the relationship of § 503(b)(9) with §§ 1 129(a)(9)
and 547. Section 1129(a)(9) requires that a Chapter 11 plan pay
administrative priorities in full in cash on the effective date of the plan.
Does that mean that a pre-bankruptcy payment to a vendor will not be a
§ 547(b) preference because it merely enabled the creditor to be paid
sooner, and not to "receive more" as required by § 547(b)(5)? 42
40. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(B) with 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9). Note the word
"promptly" in the former but not the latter. See also § 365(d)(2) and (5) (setting a time for
the payment with the word "timely").
41. Victor A. Vilaplana & Seltzer Caplan McMahon Vitek, The Rebellion Continues:
Practicalities Override Precedent in Critical Vendor Motions, 877 PLI/CoMM. 439, 445
("Notwithstanding In re Kmart, 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004), debtors' counsel continue to
ask for and bankruptcy courts' [sic] continue to approve first day motions to pay prepetition
unsecured claims prior to plan confirmation, including so-called critical vendors.").
42. See generally Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Zenith Industrial and the
Critical-Vendor Preference Defense, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32 (2005); cf In re Hayes
Lemmerz Int'l, Inc., 313 B.R. 189, 193 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) ("[t]he payments at issue
here were not made under the Critical Vendor Order; rather, they were made before the
Critical Vendor Motion was filed and before the Critical Vendor Order was entered.
Therefore, the payments at issue are not protected by the Order.").
Even more generally, these questions suggest that I used the wrong adjective in titling this
section of the article. Perhaps I should have used the word "fuzzy" instead of "muddy."
See Jack F. Wiliams, The Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer Models as
Applied to Intercorporate Guaranties: Fraudulent Transfer Law as a Fuzzy System, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1403, 1406 (1994)
Fuzzy logic permits us to expand our metaphorical thinking about the law.
Experience teaches that there are many degrees of "correctness" or "trueness."
Oftentimes, the quality of "correctness" or "trueness" depends on one's
perspective.... Fuzzy logic permits us to escape the shackles of a confining
metaphor steeped in formal logic, to rethink legal issues with a greater array of
answers with their own degrees of acceptability. The foundation of fuzzy logic
is fuzzy set theory. Aristotelian or formal logic recognizes statements as only
true or false. In contrast, fuzzy set theory recognizes partial membership in one
or more sets at the same time. Fuzzy set theory abolishes the law of the
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B. A Crystalline New Rule for Assuming Leases and Other
Contracts Notwithstanding a Historic Nonmonetary Default
A business's leases and other contracts can be a major part of
the collateral for the credit and thus a major factor in a decision whether
to extend credit. Accordingly, the question of whether a debtor can
retain (i.e., "assume") or sell (i.e., "assign") its unexpired leases or
unperformed (i.e., "executory") contracts notwithstanding bankruptcy is
an important question to commercial bankers.
It is clear from § 365(b) that a debtor must "cure" defaults in
order to assume or assign.43 What was not "crystalline" clear until
BAPCPA 44 is whether a debtor could assume a lease or executory
contract even though there had been a "nonmonetary default," such as
"going dark,, 45 that could not be cured. Section 365(b)(1)(A) now
expressly deals with nonmonetary defaults :46
(b)(1) If there has been a default in an executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, the trustee may
excluded middle in formal set theory. Whereas formal set theory insists that a
variable be either in or out of the set, fuzzy set theory permits a variable to be
in and out of the set simultaneously, usually by reducing the quality of a
variable to a qualitative relation. For example, the fuzzy set of blue swans
admits any swan that is less than totally blue, because blue becomes a
qualitative property-a matter of degree. The pale blue swan is therefore both
in and out of the set.
Id.
43. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 613 (Foundation Press
1997).
44. For a review of the law prior to BAPCPA, see generally William P. Weintraub,
Historical Defaults and Cross-Defaults: Here a Default, There a Default, Everywhere a
Default, Default, Default, 26 CAL. BANKR. J. 286 (2003).
45. Cf In re The Ground Round, Inc., No. 04-11235-WCH, 2004 WL 1732207, at *7
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) ("[A]ny continuous operations provision or 'going-dark' clause, or
similar clause prohibiting the cessation of operations at the leased premises is unenforceable
against the assignee thereof under Section 365(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code and, with
respect to a New Restaurant Location real estate lease, is not a valid restriction on use as
contemplated under Section 365(b)(3)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code for a period of one
hundred eighty (180) days following the Closing.").
46. The Bankruptcy Code now uses, but does not define, the phrase "nonmonetary
obligations." Risa Lynn Wolf-Smith, a bankruptcy partner in the Denver office of Holland
& Hart, suggests the following examples of what might constitute a monetary default:
"[b]reaches such as the failure to maintain certifications or licenses, to maintain specified
quality or qualification standards, to provide information and to operate continuously
without closure." Risa Lynn Wolf-Smith, Bankruptcy Reform and Nonmonetary Defaults -
What Have They Done Now?, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 6, 6 (2005).
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not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of
assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee -
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the
trustee will promptly cure, such default other than a
default that is a breach of a provision relating to the
satisfaction of any provision (other than a penalty rate or
penalty provision) relating to a default arising from any
failure to perform nonmonetary obligations under an
unexpired lease of real property, if it is impossible for
the trustee to cure such default by performing
nonmonetary acts at and after the time of assumption,
except that if such default arises from a failure to
operate in accordance with a nonresidential real property
lease, then such default shall be cured by performance at
and after the time of assumption in accordance with
such lease, and pecuniary losses resulting from such
default shall be compensated in accordance with the
provisions of this paragraph.47
As Judge Richard Posner wrote in In re Handy Andy Home
Improvement Centers, Inc., "[s]tatutory language like other language
should be read in context. The context consists not merely of other
sentences but also of the real-world situations to which the language
pertains .... When context is disregarded, silliness results. ''4  How
would you use the statutory provision set out above to answer the
following questions about a "real-world situation to which" § 365(b)
pertains?
49
47. 11 U.S.C. 365(b)(1)(A) (2005). Language was also added to section 1124.(2)(A),
(D). Alan N. Resnick & Henry J Sommer, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005: A Section-by-Section Analysis, 2005 SUPPLEMENT
COLLIER PORTABLE PAMPHLET XLIII (2005) ("Similar kinds of provisions on the obligation to
cure nonmonetary defaults are added to section 1124(2) with respect to the impairment of a
class of claims."). For a review of the legislative process that led to section 365(b)(1)(A),
see generally David G. Epstein & Lisa Normand, "Real World" and Academic Questions
About "Non-monetary Obligations Under the 2005 Version of 365(b) ", _ AMER. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. _ (2006). The next paragraph in the text is the only paragraph of text that I
"borrowed" from the ABI article. And it is one of the ABI article paragraphs that I wrote.
48. Matter of Handy Andy Home Improvement Centers, Inc., 144 F.3d 1125, 1128 (7th
Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
49. 1 have been looking for an opportunity to use "pertain" in a law review article.
Since 1971 (the year I started my teaching career as a "baby professor' at the University of
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Debtors operated a General Motors (GM) automobile dealership
in a building leased from Landlord. On November 7, 2005, Debtors
ceased operating their automobile dealership. The bankruptcy cases
were not filed until November 20, 2005. The GM Dealer Agreement
and the lease with Landlord each provided that the failure to operate the
business for seven consecutive business days was an event of default.
Debtors' failure to operate the dealership for two weeks preceding the
bankruptcy filing constituted a nonmonetary default - "a 'historical
fact' [that], by definition, cannot be cured. 50
Notwithstanding the noncurable default under the lease, Debtors
can, at least "in theory," assume Landlord's lease because "an unexpired
lease of real property" comes within the "other than" language that
BAPCPA added to § 365(c)(1)(A). Debtors cannot however assume the
GM franchise agreement. Only "an unexpired lease of real property"
comes within the "other than" language.
In the preceding paragraph, I used the "weasel words,"' "in
theory" with respect-to Debtors' assumption of the lease with Landlord
because the "other than" language requires "performance at and after
the time of assumption., 52 How can Debtors' continue to operate their
North Carolina School of Law), the word "pertain" has appeared in the Harvard Law
Review 152 times (isn't Westlaw wonderful) and my words have yet to appear in the
Harvard Law Review.
50. In re Claremont Acquisition Corp., 113 F.3d 1029, 1033-35 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that debtors could not assume the franchise agreement because they were required
but unable to cure the nonmonetary default). The First Circuit reached a different decision
in In re Bankvest Capital Corp., 360 F.3d 291, 301 (1st Cir. 2004), holding that a debtor is
not required to cure a nonmonetary default. But cf Ralph Brubaker, Cure of Nonmonetary
Defaults as a Prerequisite to Assumption of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases: A
Lesson in the Nature and Function of the Cure Requirement, 24 BANKRUPTCY LAW LETTER
No. 12 p. 1 (December 2004) (making a persuasive argument based on contract law
principles and stating that "[t]he notion that most (if not all) nonmonetary defaults are
incurable is therefore misguided"); see also James 1. Stang, Assumption of Contracts and
Leases: The Obstacle of the Historical Default, 24 CAL. BANKR. J. 39 (1998).
51. A weasel word is a word that avoids forming a clear position on an issue. Theodore
Roosevelt once said in a speech:
One of our defects as a nation is a tendency to use what have been
called weasel words. When a weasel sucks eggs, it sucks the meat out
of the egg and leaves it an empty shell. If you use a weasel word after
another there is nothing left of the other.
BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER'S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE (Oxford University Press 2003).
52. The "other than" language in § 365(b)(1)(A) also requires payment for "pecuniary
losses resulting from such default." 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(l)(A). Note that § 365(b)(1)(B)
contains almost identical language. I "noticed" that for almost a paragraph in David G.
Epstein & Lisa Normand, "Real World" and "Academic Questions About "Nonmonetary
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business on Landlord's premises as required by the lease agreement
with Landlord if Debtors' business is a GM franchise and Debtor
cannot assume its franchise agreement without curing a historical fault
that is "impossible" to cure? Another way of asking the same question
is how can a lender make an asset-based loan to a business debtor
whose assets are based on a franchise agreement?
And the same questions can arise in connection with an
equipment lease. What if an equipment lease requires that the lessee
maintain insurance and there was a brief period of time, prior to the
lessee's bankruptcy filing, in which the insurance lapsed? In new §
365(b)(1)(A), Congress treats equipment leases like executory contracts
not like real estate leases.
A different question that debtors in historical default on
important equipment leases or franchise agreements might raise is
whether the default is sufficiently "material" to preclude assumption.
The word "material" is not a part of the BAPCPA § 365(b)(1)(A); was
not a part of the pre-BAPCPA § 365(b)(1)(A). Nonetheless, there is
some pre-BAPCPA authority for requiring cure under section
365(b)(1)(A) only if the default is material.53
A recent law review article by two bankruptcy partners in the
New York office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom suggests a
still different strategy for debtors with equipment lease or franchise
agreement problems under BAPCPA. "Rather, the debtor may choose
neither to assume nor to reject, leaving open the possibility of post-
emergence litigation over whether the nondebtor party may terminate
the contract or lease under applicable nonbankruptcy laws. 5 4
There is some support for this strategy. Under § 365(d), a
Chapter 11 debtor does not have to assume or reject an executory
Obligations " Under the 2005 Version of 365(b), AMER. BANKR. INST. L. J. _ (2006).
53. E.g., In re Whitsett, 163 B.R. 752, 754 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) ("[I]t is clear that a
bankruptcy court has 'some latitude' in determining whether provisions in a debtor-tenant's
lease may be deemed waived and their compliance be deemed insignificant in the
assumption process. The determining factor appears to be the 'materiality' of the default in
issue.") (citation omitted); In re Windmill Farms, Inc., 841 F.2d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1988)
("[T]he bankruptcy court found the alleged nonmonetary defaults were not of sufficient
substance to preclude assumption of the lease. This finding is not clearly erroneous.");
Brubaker, supra note 50, at 1 ("the concept of the 'cure' of defaults, by its very nature, is a
material breach concept").
54. Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 15, at 626.
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contract or equipment lease until confirmation of the plan.5 And, a
recent law review article indicates, there is case law that an unassumed
executory contract can "ride through" a bankruptcy case.56
C. New Muddy Rules for Small Business Cases
For years,57 law professors and real lawyers believed that the
"S" in small business cases should be capitalized because of the
pioneering work of North Carolina's Judge Thomas Small. 8 There
55. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (2005).
56. Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 15, at 626 (citing In re Hernandez, 287 B.R.
795 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002)). See generally Mette H. Kurth & Joel Ohlgren, Ride Through
Revisited (Again): The Strategic Use of the Ride-through Doctrine in the Post-Catapult Era,
24-5 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16, 60-61 (2005).
57. See generally Josef Athanas, Expediting the Administration of the Estate in Chapter
11. 8 J. BANKR. L. & PRACT. 103, 115 (January/February 1999). From 1978 until 1994,
there were no special provisions for small business debtors in the Bankruptcy Code, only
special procedures in some bankruptcy courts. The 1994 amendments, Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994), gave chapter 11 debtors who had
$2,000,000 or less in liquidated debts the option of dispensing with creditors' committees,
and opting for a fast-track to confirmation through the ability to combine a disclosure
statement hearing with a hearing on plan confirmation. Id. "In 1994, partly in response to
the positive results achieved by Judge Small and other judges in speeding the administration
of the estate in smaller cases by combining the disclosure statement approval and plan of
reorganization confirmation hearings, Congress amended sections 105 and 1125 of the
Bankruptcy Code." Id.
58. See Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First
Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and
Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 190 n.86 (2000).
By now, most bankruptcy professionals are familiar with the 'fast-track'
procedures pioneered by Judge A. Thomas Small, Jr. in the Eastern
District of North Carolina to streamline and expedite the process for
small businesses. Judge Small did lobby Congress to codify a special
reorganization chapter, but the failure of Congress to respond has not
impeded the efforts of Judge Small to adapt the present statute to the
needs of particular types of cases and Judge Small's model has been
followed across the country.
Id.
See also George W. Hay, Lawyers Overwhelmingly Endorse Judge Small's "Fast Track"
I l's, TURNAROUND AND WORKOUTS, July 15, 1989, at 1; See generally Bernard Trujillo,
Self-Organizing Legal Systems: Precedent and Variation in Bankruptcy, 2004 UTAH L. REV.
483, 533.
In self-organizing systems, norms emerge through a complex process of
selection. Sometimes norms emerge when actors imitate a particular
innovation known for its excellence at resolving a problem. An example
of this sort of norm emergence is the spread of "fast-track" procedures
for small business bankruptcies that were developed in the Eastern
District of North Carolina. This particular form has spread to many
other jurisdictions.
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were Small (as in Judge Small) business bankruptcy cases - cases that
Judge Small made work through flexible procedures. The new
BAPCPA rules for small business debtors, at best, simply make for
more work - more work that must be done more quickly.
There are five sections of BAPCPA that require enhanced
reporting by "small business debtors., 59 And BAPCPA has amended
two other sections to require that small business debtors reorganize
more quickly.
Section 1121 requires that small business debtors file the plan
and disclosure statement not later than 300 days after the order for
relief.6 ° And, under § 1129, the plan must be confirmed within forty-
five days after it is filed.6' A bankruptcy judge can extend these
deadlines only if the debtor "(A) ... demonstrates by a preponderance
of the evidence that it is more likely than not that the court will confirm
a plan within a reasonable period of time; (B) a new deadline is imposed
at the time the extension is granted; and (C) the order extending time is
signed before the existing deadline has expired.,
62
Under BAPCPA, neither a bankruptcy judge like Judge Small
nor the debtor will be able to decide whether the debtor would benefit
Id.
59. See Bruce A. Markell, Small Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, SL068 ALI-ABA 263, 268 (2005).
One theme of the small business amendments is that creditors deserve
more and better information, presented in understandable and
recognizable formats. Many sections of the small business amendments
were framed with this goal in mind. In particular, there are five sections
that require enhanced reporting in some way by small business debtors:
(1)Section 419, regarding increased reporting of the assets and
operations of any entity, including a closely-held corporation, in which
the debtor holds a substantial or controlling interest;
(2)Section 433, which directs the national Bankruptcy Rules Committee
to prepare standard forms of disclosure statements and plans of
reorganization for small business debtors;
(3) Section 434, which would add section 308 to the Bankruptcy Code
regarding periodic reporting of financial operations by small business
debtors;
(4) Section 435, which specifically directs the National Bankruptcy
Rules Committee to develop forms to implement new section 308; and
(5)Section 436, which would add section 1116 to the Bankruptcy Code
regarding enhanced filing and other duties of small business debtors.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e)(2) (2005).
61. § 1129(e).
62. § 1121(e)(3); § 1129(e) (2005).
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from these new expedited procedures. Congress has already made that
decision. Sort of.
The small business provisions are no longer elective. All
Chapter 11 debtors that meet the new § 101 definition of "small
business debtor' 63 must comply the BAPCPA small ousiness debtor
requirements.
The new definition of "small business debtor" contains two
separate requirements: (1) a debt requirement and (2) a creditors'
committee requirement. Looking first at the debt requirement, if the
debt is no more than $2 million64 at the time of the filing of the petition,
then look at whether there is a creditors' committee and whether the
creditors' committee is active. 65  The debt requirement can be finally
resolved at the time of the petition.
The creditors' committee requirement can be more troublesome.
As Judge Bruce Markell has observed,
[A]ll chapter 11 debtors who are within the applicable
debt limits will commence their cases as small business
cases. They may lose that status, however, if a
committee is formed, but may regain it if that committee
isn't doing its job. The chameleon-like character of the
definition takes on heightened importance, given the
different duties, obligations, and burdens the small
business debtor faces.66
III.CONGRESS's LACK OF TRUST OF CONGRESS
Before adjourning for 2005, Congress had time to "clear"
professional baseball player Rafael Palmeiro of perjury.6 7 Congress did
not, however, have time to "clear up" BAPCPA. Congress's failure to
63. § 101(51D).
64. Id. In applying the "not more than $2,000,000" requirement look only at
"liquidated" debt. § 101(51 D)(A).
65. § 101(51D)(A). The statutory language is,"[A] case in which the United States
trustee has not appointed under section 1102(a)(1) a committee of unsecured creditors or
where the court has determined that the committee of unsecured creditors is not sufficiently
active and representative to provide effective oversight of the debtor." Id.
66. See Markell, supra note 59, at 268.
67. Richard Sandomir, Report: No Evidence of Perjury by Palmeiro, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
11, 2005, at D1.
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correct "typos" and confusing language during the 2005 legislative
process and since the enactment of BAPCPA suggests that Congress no
longer trusts Congress to make decisions about bankruptcy.
A. Proofing problems
As the editors of the North Carolina Banking Institute Journal
can attest, I cannot find the proofing problems in my own manuscript.
Nonetheless, even I can find examples of proofing problems in
BAPCPA.
1. New ground for relief from stay
For example, § 362(d)(4) uses a new phrase to create a new
basis for relief with respect to real property collateral - "filing of the
petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder and defraud." Elsewhere
in the Bankruptcy Code68 and other federal statutes,69 Congress uses the
phrase "hinder, delay, or defraud." Do you think that Congress could
have intended to create a new, higher standard? Of more immediate
importance, do you think that a bankruptcy judge could look solely at
the "plain meaning" of what Congress said and not consider what
Congress must have intended?
2. Utility service
Your turn. What is the time deadline for providing adequate
assurance to utilities under newly revised § 366 set out in pertinent part
below? Section 366:
b) Such utility may alter, refuse, or discontinue service
if neither the trustee nor the debtor, within 20 days after
the date of the order for relief, furnishes adequate
assurance of payment, in the form of a deposit or other
security, for service after such date....
C)...
68. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32A) (2005); § 522(o); § 548(a)(1)(A) § 727(a)(2).
69. See e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2005); 28 U.S.C. 3302 (2005).
2006]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
(2) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), with respect to a
case filed under chapter 11, a utility referred to in
subsection (a) may alter, refuse, or discontinue utility
service, if during the 30-day period beginning on the
date of the filing of the petition, the utility does not
receive from the debtor or the trustee adequate assurance
of payment for utility service that is satisfactory to the
utility.
70
If a utility receives a cash deposit more than twenty days but
less than thirty days after the debtor files its Chapter 11 petition, can the
utility discontinue service? Is the right number twenty or is it thirty?
Does the phrase "a case filed under chapter 11" which appears in
BAPCPA added § 366(c)(2), but not § 366(b)(1) mean that the thirty is
the right number for chapter 11 cases and twenty is the right number for
cases under other chapters? What is the number of cases under other
chapters in which there will be an issue of utility service under § 366?
Read the provisions more carefully. Section 366(b) measures
the twenty days from the "order for relief' while § 366(c) refers to a
thirty-day period beginning on the date of the "filing of the petition.'
In involuntary cases, there is a difference between "order for relief' and
"filing of the petition."
And, read even more carefully. How important is it that the
phrase "satisfactory to the utility" appears only in § 366(c)(2)? 72
70. 11 U.S.C. 366(b) & (c) (2005).
71. Id.
72. See In re Lucre, Inc., 333 B.R. 151 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005).
Debtor requests that I continue the subsection (a) injunction with respect
to Consumers Energy, Sprint and IXC notwithstanding subsection (c)
because of their failure to respond to its offers of adequate assurance.
However, subsection (c) does not give me that discretion, for it clearly
requires as a condition to continuing the injunction either the utility's
acceptance of the adequate assurance offered by the Chapter 11 trustee
or debtor in possession or the Chapter 11 trustee's or debtor in
possession's acceptance of the adequate assurance offered by the utility.
Granted, subsection (c)(3) does give the trustee or debtor in possession
the right to have the adequate assurance payment modified by the court.
However, that right arises only after the adequate assurance payment
has been agreed upon by the parties. In other words, the trustee or
debtor in possession has no recourse to modify the adequate assurance
payment the utility is demanding until the trustee or debtor in possession
actually accepts what the utility proposes.
[Vol. 10
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Regardless of how carefully you read § 366 - you can read it so
carefully that you are willing to discuss it in an article in the American
Bankruptcy Law Journal - you are still going to conclude that "[i]t is
unclear how soon the debtor-in-possession must furnish adequate
assurance of payment to the utility under BAPCPA. ' 73
B. Placement Problems
1. Credit counseling and involuntary petitions
Section 109, as its title indicates, deals with the question of
"who may be a debtor." Prior to BAPCPA, nothing in the § 101
definition of "debtor" or in § 109 distinguished between debtors in
voluntary cases and debtors in involuntary cases.
BAPCPA adds a requirement of budget and credit counseling
for individuals. 74  New subsection (h) to § 109 now provides - "an
individual may not be a debtor under this title unless such individual
has, during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing of the
petition by such individual, received. .. "
It can be argued that the above language means that Congress
has created a new defense to involuntary petitions against individuals
such that creditors cannot file an involuntary petition against an
individual unless and until she has completed the required counseling.
This argument is consistent with the notion that all of the rest of § 109
applies to both voluntary and involuntary cases - noscitur a sociis.
7 5
Id.
This opinion also distinguished between the word "service" in § 366(b) and the phrase
"utility service" in § 366(c)(2). Id.
73. Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 15, at 608. But see Marcia Goldstein &
Victoria Vron, Current Issues in Debtor in Possession Financing, ALI-ABA CHAPTER 11
BuSINESS REORGANIZATIONS, June 9-11, SK092 ALI-ABA 115, 151 (2005).
Currently, section 366 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a utility
company may alter, refuse, or discontinue service to the DIP if the DIP
does not provide adequate assurance of payment within 20 days after the
date of the order for relief, in the form of a deposit or other security.
Although section 417 of the 2005 Act extends the time within which the
DIP has to provide adequate assurance of payment to 30 days ....
Id.
74. John D. Hurst, Note, Consumer Protection Issues: Protecting Consumers from
Consumer Credit Counseling, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 159, 170 (2005).
75. State v. Merino, 81 Haw. 198, 915 P.2d 672, 691 (1996) ("[T]he canon of
construction denominated noscitur a sociis... may be freely translated as 'words of a
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A different argument can be made by focusing on the phrase "by
such individual" § 109(h) applies only to petitions filed by the debtor.76
This argument is consistent with the notion that courts should give
meaning to all words in a statute.77
Isn't this an unnecessary issue to argue? Is there a better place
for the credit counseling requirement for individuals filing voluntary
petitions than § 109?
2. Asset sales by unprofitable for-profit corporations and the law of
non-profits
And isn't there a better place for the phrase "not a moneyed,
business or commercial corporation or trust" than at the end of §
363(d)(1). After BAPCPA, that section reads:
(d) The trustee may use, sell, or lease property under
subsection (b) or (c) of this section only -
(1) in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law
that governs the transfer of property by a corporation or
trust that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial
corporation or trust;
As written and set out above, it can be argued that § 363(d)(1)
requires all sales in bankruptcy - even sales by for profit debtors such as
GM - must comply with the non-bankruptcy law regulating non-profit
corporations and trusts. Again, there is a counter-argument:
nonbankruptcy law governing non-profits is not "applicable" law as that
word is used in § 363(d)(1) when the debtor is GM or some other
ostensibly for profit business entity. Again, enacting "technical
amendments" could eliminate an unnecessary argument caused by
where BAPCPA language has been placed.
feather flock together,' that is, the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it
keeps.").
76. See Bruce C. Scalambrino, Bankruptcy Reform for Non-Bankruptcy Lawyers, 93
ILL. B. J. 518, 522-23 (2005).
77. Negonsott v. Sanniels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993).
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3. Small business debtor reporting
Section 308 details the filing requirements for a "small business
debtor." Under § 103, Chapter 3 provisions are applicable in Chapter 7,
11 and 13 cases.
Note also that the requirements are directed to a "small business
debtor" not "small business case." Section 308(b) begins "A small
business debtor shall..."
The § 101(51)(C) definition of "small business case" includes
the limiting language "filed under Chapter 11." The § 101(51)(D)
definition of "small business debtor" is not so expressly limited.
It can be argued that since § 101(51)(D) refers to § 1102 that a
"small business debtor" can only be a Chapter 11 debtor and that § 308
can only apply in Chapter 11 cases. And, it can be argued that placing
the reporting requirements in Chapter 3 and using the term "small
business debtor" means that the reporting requirements can apply in
Chapter 7 cases and Chapter 13 cases in which the debtor is "engaged in
commercial or business activities" and has debts of "no more than $2
million." And, yet again, it would seem that a technical amendment
moving the reporting requirements to Chapter 11 could easily eliminate
the arguments.78
4. Reclamation
Finally, consider the BAPCPA provisions on reclamation placed
in § 546(c). Section 546 is surrounded by avoiding powers, which have
the effect of increasing what is available to the estate by decreasing the
rights of a particular creditor.79 And, § 546 is entitled "Limitations on
avoiding powers."
78. 11 U.S.C. § 308 (2005). If filing requirements for a small business debtor were
changed to requirements for a "small business case" and were moved from § 308 to
Chapter 11 then the number "308" could be used for what is now § 1514. 11 U.S.C. §
1514 (2005). That section sets out the procedure for giving a "foreign creditor" notice in a
"case under this title." Id. In other words, section 1514 applies in Chapter 7, 11 and 13
cases. Id. In fairness, section 103(k)(l) so provides, but is it fair to expect attorneys to
catch that the first time around? 11 U.S.C. § 103(k)(1) (2005).
79. See generally CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 613 (Foundation
Press 1997) (1997).
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Until BAPCPA, that was the right place for the Bankruptcy
Code provision on reclamation because that provision simply
acknowledged "any common law or statutory right of reclamation" and
limited the use of the Bankruptcy Code avoiding powers on such non-
bankruptcy reclamation rights. In structure and effect, § 546, before
BAPCPA, was similar to § 553 which acknowledges a nonbankruptcy
right of setoff and limits the use of avoiding powers on such
nonbankruptcy rights.80
The "old" and BAPCPA versions of § 546(c) are set out below:
(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section
the rights and powers of a trustee under section 544(a),
545, 547, and 549 of this title are subject to any
statutory or common law right of a seller of goods that
has sold goods to the debtor, in the ordinary course of
such seller's business, to reclaim such goods if the
debtor has received such goods while insolvent, but
(1) such a seller may not reclaim any such goods unless
such seller demands in writing reclamation of such
goods-
(A) before 10 days after receipt of such goods by the
debtor, or
(B) if such 10 day period expires after the
commencement of the case, before 20 days after receipt
of such goods by the debtor, and
(2) the court may deny reclamation to a selle with such a
right of reclamation that has made such a demand only if
the court-
(A) grants the claim of such a seller priority as a claim
of a kind specified in section 503(b) of this title, or
(B) secures such claim by a lien.8'
The "new" § 546(c) of BAPCPA reads:
(c)(1) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this
80. Id. at 406-12.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1998) amended by 11 U.S.C. 546(c) (2005).
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section and in section 507(c), and subject to the prior
rights of a holder of a security interest in such goods or
the proceeds thereof, the rights and powers of the trustee
under sections 544(a), 545, 547, and 549 are subject to
the right of a seller of goods that has sold goods to the
debtor, in the ordinary course of such seller's business,
to reclaim such goods if the debtor has received such
goods while insolvent, within 45 days before the date of
the commencement of a case under this title, but such
seller may not reclaim such goods unless such seller
demands in writing reclamation of such goods-
(A) not later than 45 days after the date of receipt of
such goods by the debtor; or
(B) not later than 20 days after the date of
commencement of the case, if the 45-day period expires
after the commencement of the case.
(2) If a seller of goods fails to provide notice in the
manner described in paragraph (1), the seller still may
assert the rights contained in section 503(b)(9).82
First, the reference to "statutory or common law" has been
eliminated.8 3 Recall that until BAPCPA, the right of reclamation that
existed in bankruptcy was derivative of state law - more specifically of
the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-702 which generally imposed a ten-
day limit on reclamation.84 By eliminating the reference to "statutory or
common law" and by stating that the seller has forty-five days in which
to act, Congress seems to have created a new bankruptcy right of
reclamation that is greater than any right of reclamation under non-
bankruptcy law.
Of course, there is nothing in § 546 or the legislative history that
expressly indicates that Congress intended to create a new, independent
82. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2005).
83. See supra notes 81 & 82 and accompanying text. There is a new reference to an
exception in § 507(c). § 507(c). That is probably another proofing error. That section deals
with the priority of claims of governmental units. The exception should probably refer to §
507(b) which concerns failed adequate protection rights. Id.
84. See generally Craig M. Geno & Meade W. Mitchell, Basic Principles of Bankruptcy
and State Reclamation, 18 MisS. C.L.REv. 443 (1998).
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right of reclamation. And, of course, there is again the noscitur a sociis
(or "what is a nice girl like you doing in a place like this") argument.
The rest of § 546, like the title suggests, simply limits the use of
avoiding powers with respect to claims, rights, and interests that exist
outside of bankruptcy. And, the rest of the sections surrounding § 546
reduce the rights of a particular party to increase the rights of the estate
instead of creating new independent rights in sellers.
If § 546(c) creates a new, non-derivative right of reclamation,
what are the limits on that right? More specifically, can the seller
reclaim the goods not only from its customers but also from its
customers' customers?
The answer to this question under prior law was "no." Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, the major piece of nonbankruptcy
legislation governing reclamation, "The seller's right to claim ... is
subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith
purchaser under this article (§ 2-403)y.85
The answer under BAPCPA § 546(c) is not "no" but instead,
once again, "I don't know." If BAPCPA creates an independent right of
setoff, then the UCC's limits on reclamation are irrelevant. BAPCPA §
546(c) expressly recognizes that a seller's reclamation rights are
subordinate to the rights of a holder of security interest in the same
goods but does not mention the rights of a buyer of the goods. Under
the doctrine of expresio unius exclusio alterius, . . . .6
My resort to Latin maxims is probably attributable to watching
re-runs of HBO's Rome.87 I would have been better served by re-
reading (reading?) Shakespeare's Julius Casear:
Cassius: Did Cicero say any thing?
Casca: Ay, he spoke Greek.
Cassius: To what effect?
85. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (2005).
86. State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) ("The maxim expresio
unius est exclusion alterius is often employed in the construction of statutes. In general, it
means that a statute's inclusion of a specific limitation excludes all other limitations of that
type"); see also Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thomburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1293(D.C. Cir. 1989) ("For example, if Congress banned the importation of apples, oranges, andbananas from a particular country, the canon of expresio unius est exclusion alterius might
well indicate that Congress did not intend to ban the importation of grapefruits.").
87. Rome, http://www.hbo.com/rome, (last visited December 19, 2005).
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Casca: Nay, an I tell you that, I'll ne'er look you i' the
face again; but those that understood him smiled at one
another and shook their heads; but, for mine own part, it
was Greek to me. 8
Congress spoke "Greek" in BAPCPA. Technical amendments
would help. And commercial lenders need this help in making the
"whom do you trust" decisions they regularly make.
IV.AND WHOM Do COMMERCIAL LENDERS TRUST
The question of whom Congress trusts is a question asked and
answered by academics.89 The question of whom lenders to businesses
trust is a question asked and answered daily by commercial bankers in
deciding whether and how to do new credit transactions and what if
anything to do about existing, troubled credit transactions. And, the
possible effect of bankruptcy and the bankruptcy laws is a part - not the
most important part, but a part - of answering that question.
BAPCPA affects how commercial creditors answer that
question. BAPCPA can be seen as a double "win" for consumer
creditors. First, BAPCPA makes it more difficult for consumer debtors
to file for bankruptcy. Second, BAPCPA makes it more difficult for
consumer debtors with meaningful income or assets to leave bankruptcy
with as much of that income or assets.
It is harder to see how BAPCPA will be a win for secured
lenders. 90 BAPCPA does not make it harder for business debtors -
88. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 1, sc. 2.
89. Professor Elizabeth Warren of the Harvard Law School might answer that question
"Citibank, MNBA and their lobbyists." Elizabeth Warren, Show Me the Money, N.Y. TIMES,
October 24, 2005 at A21 ("Is there celebration in the halls of Citibank this week. Is MNBA
uncorking the Champagne... Last Monday, the law they lobbied for went into effect.");
Professor David A. Skeel, Jr. of the University of Pennsylvania Law School might answer
that question "Wall Street" and "investment bankers." See David A. Skeel, Jr., Dejb vu All
Over Again in American Corporate Bankruptcy?, 79 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NAT. CONF.
OF BANKR. JUDGES 12-7, 12-11, 12-17 (2005).
90. Contra Alan M. Christenfeld & Shepherd W. Melzer, 2005 Bankruptcy
Amendments. A Secured Creditor's Perspective, N.Y.L.J. August 4, 2005 ("The overall
tenor of the Act is to make bankruptcy, including Chapter 11, less hospitable to debtors and
to reduce a debtor's powers while it is in bankruptcy. This would appear at first blush to
help secured creditors.") Professor Melissa B. Jacoby of the University of North Carolina
School of Law is, appropriately enough, more professional in her assessment:
Legal and sociological research suggests that the bill's impact will be
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individuals or business entities - to file for bankruptcy. Instead,
BAPCPA arguably makes it harder for business debtors to reorganize in
Chapter 11, and BAPCPA provides new recoveries and rights for
employees, landlords, utilities, and vendors that will inevitably reduce
what is available to secured lenders.
As Wynonna should have sung at the NBCJ "Final Night
Dinner" in San Antonio:
Tom Dunn,9' / tell me bout the good old days /
Sometimes it feels just like / Congress has gone crazy /
Tom Dunn, / take me back before BAP CP)A /
When how an 11 would turn out /
Didn't seem so hazy
Did debtors ever simply stay
In leases after the two-ten day? /
Were confidences something committees kept /
Not something they must say? /
Did key executives never really go away /
Because of the KERPS 11 debtors pay? /
Oh, Tom Dunn, / tell me about the good old days. /
filtered through the influence of day-to-day actors in the bankruptcy
system. As in the past, this filtering may mute or magnify certain
statutory changes and may produce variation around the country.Assessments of the impact of formal changes are incomplete without
taking this filtering into account.
Melissa B. Jacoby, Ripple or Revolution? The Indeterminancy of StatutoryBankruptcy Reform, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 169, 170 (2005).
91. "Tom Dunn" is, of course, J. Thomas Dunn, Jr., the prominent North Carolinaattorney who, along with the prominent Florida attorney Leonard Gilbert, invited me tospeak at the Banking Institute. I understand that Wynonna's version of the song uses theword 'Grandpa' instead of "Tom Dunn." I also understand that people in North Carolinagenerally think "Grandpa" when they see Tom. And, I know that you understand that thereasons that I used "Tom Dunn" in the song instead of "Leonard Gilbert" are that (1) "TomDunn" works better in the rhyme scheme than "Leonard Gilbert" and (2) Tom is a lot olderthan Leonard and (3) Leonard's firm has referred more business than Tom's firm.
